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RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH IN VIRGINIA. THE
EFFECT OF "DEPENDENCY" AND "PECUNIARY LOSS"
In 1968, substantial changes occurred m the statute allowing recovery for
wrongful death in Virgima. 1 The General Assembly established "dependents" as a new class of persons, entitled to recover up to a maximum of
W$50,000 in proportion to their "pecuniary loss." 2 The statute also designates
a class of persons as beneficiaries and allows them to recover an additional
$25,000 for solace 3 Thus, the total amount potentially available to persons
who qualify as both a dependent and a statutory beneficiary is $75,000.
The statutory changes are of great importance to anyone seeking damages
for wrongful death. 4 Both the persons eligible to recover and the criteria
for recoverer differ from the old provisions. With the revisions in 1968,
dependency is "a condition precedent to recovery
for financial or
pecuniary loss." 5 Past decisions are of little value in ascertaining the meaning of "dependents" and "pecuniary loss." Indeed, since the beneficiaries
entitled to damages were named in the former statute, dependency was not
an issue.
Although the meanings of dependent and pecuniary loss are not fully
,settled; a process of judicial clarification in Virginia has begun with several
decisions since 1968. The most important of these cases is Pugh v. Yearout,
a: case relied upon in subsequent decisions dealing with the question of pecumary loss and dependency
InPugb, the decedent, a housewife who earned a small portion of the
family's income, was survived by a husband and young daughter. Her primary contribution to the family was the performance of various household

I Before 1968, the statutory provisions for wrongful death in Virginia differed from
most wrongful death .acts, including the original Lord Campbell's Act. Virginia permitted a designated class of beneficiaries to recover for sorrow and lack of decedents
society and attention instead of limiting recovery only to pecuniary loss suffered by
dependents. Within the conservative lirmt of $40,000, judicial interpretation of the
statutory requirement that damages be "fair and just" provided a liberal basis for re\covery Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 159 S.E.2d 836 (1968); Matthews v. Hicks, 197
Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); Craig, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death, 5 U.
RicH. L. Rav. 213 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Craig]; Note, Wrongful Death Damages
in Virginia, 12 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 396 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 12 Wm. & MARY
L. Rxv.1.
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
3 In addition, the statute permits recovery for funeral expenses up to $500 and actual
ambulance service, hospital, and medical expenses. Id.
4Two articles, published shortly after the changes, discuss in detail the implications
of the new provisions. Craig, supra note 1 and 12 Wm. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1.
5 Craig, supra note 1, at 223.
6 212 Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 58 (1972).
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chores and duties, the cost of equivalent services being $50 to $60 a week.
Despite the defendant's objections that the facts did not establish a dependency relationship and showing of pecuniary loss, decedent's husband
and child were allowed to recover as dependents.
While other cases have developed the court's position in other areas of
dependency,7 Pugh is the most significant because it is a definite attempt by
the Virginia court to establish standards for dependency and pecuniary loss.
In dealing with the issue of dependency, the court clearly differentiates
dependents from the beneficiaries entitled to an award for solace." Today,
beneficiaries who may recover for solace are the same persons eligible for an
award under the old statute.9 A beneficiary may qualify and participate
in an award merely by showing that he was within the class of persons the
statute designates as beneficiaries.' 0 In contrast to this liberal approach,
Pugh strictly defines the concept of dependency. A showing of actual dependency is necessary, with dependency being a question of fact determined
by the jury based upon the "factual circumstances existing at the time of
death." 'l As a result, dependents may be part or all of the group recover2
ing for solace or they may be entirely different persons.'
In addition, the decision narrows the scope of pecuniary loss. The old
view of pecuniary loss, interpreted liberally to include the decedent's care,
attention, and society,13 has been reduced to a strictly monetary connotation. The court permits damages for pecuniary loss only where a person
would benefit financially "by the continuing life of the decedent." 14 How7 Patton v. Rose, 213 Va. 36, 189 S.E.2d 385 (1972); Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 836, 188
S.E.2d 226 (1972); Claar v. Culpepper, 212 Va. 771, 188 S.E.2d 86 (1972).
8 212 Va. at 595, 186 SZ.2d at 62.

9 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (1957) 'with VA. CoDE ANN. S 8-636 (Cum. Supp.
1972).
10 If ever a claimant's status as beneficiary became an issue, the court has tried whenever possible to decide favorably for the claimant. In Matthews, the court classified the
decedents wife as a beneficiary, even though the couple was separated and she was
involved in an adulterous relationship with another man. 197 Va. 112, 120-21, 87
SE.2d 629, 634-35 (1955). Decisions have also included as beneficiaries relatives of the
halfblood and parents of the decedent who have remarried. Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va.
479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
11 Pugh v. Yearout, 212 Va. at 595, 186 S.E.2d at 62.
12Although the decision required proof of actual dependency, it did not preclude
recovery based on partial dependency. It rejected the defendant's argument that the
decedent's husband and child were not dependents since the husband earned a salary
used to support himself and his child. The court reasoned, "[plartial dependency may
exist even though a dependent could subsist without the contribution made by the deceased." Id.
13 Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 654, 159 SZE.2d 836, 842 (1968).
14 212 Va. at 595, 186 S.E.2d at 62.
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ever, the court does consider services "that relate to and have monetary
value" as financial benefits.' 5
I. DEPENDENCY
follows the majority of jurisdictions in which
Pugb
v.
Yearout,
Virginia
In
dependency is a prerequisite for recovery for wrongful death. By permitting recovery based upon partial dependency, Virginia adopts the more liberal majority view.' The court rejects a more restrictive approach defining dependency in terms of actual inability to support one's selflY Under
the Virginia view, a substantial contribution in money or services along
with a reasonable expectation of its continuance is sufficient to establish
dependency.' 8
Likewise, the requirement of actual dependency based upon a factual
rather than a legal determination of dependency follows the reasoning of
a majority of courts in the United States.19 An actual relationship of dependency based upon reliance by the claimant is necessary, 20 and legal
dependents may be excluded because a lineal relationship raises no presump21
tion of dependency.
The majority view of dependency, while logically correct, is unfortunate
in that it emphasizes factual questions involving the monetary contributions
of the decedent at the expense of the equitable considerations that originally
motivated wrongful death statutes. The court is left in the position of deciding how far, for a given set of facts, it wishes to go in interpreting monetary contributions as sufficient to establish a dependency relationship. As a
is willing to view dependresult, recovery is often denied unless the court
22
ency in a liberal and often unnatural context.
Decisions in Virginia subsequent to Pugh illustrate the difficulties involved
in following a strictly financial approach in determining the existence of
dependents. To recover, a claimant must establish a reasonable probability
'1 Id.

16See e.g., Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 20 S.E. 550(1894);
Carianni v. Schwenker, 38 NJ. Super. 350, 118 A.2d 847 (1955); 22 AM. Juu. 2d Death
§ 29 (1965).

Wadsworth v. Friend, 201 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1967).
Is Craig, supra note 1, at 225; 12 WM. &MARY L. REv., supra note 1, at 406.
19Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952); 22 AM. Jua.
2d supra note 16.
2
' Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952).
21 Rust v. Holland, 15 Ill. App. 2d 369, 146 N.E.2d 82, 67 A.R.2d 739 (1957).
22
In Thompson v. Board of Rd. Comm'rs, 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959), for
example, the parents of a fifteen year old girl recovered for her death as dependents.
The decedent presently earned approximately $5 a week as a babysitter which she gave
to the family. Her promise to assist in the support of the family after she finished school
and reached the age of 21 was sufficient to establish a dependency relationship.
17
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of pecuniary benefit from the continuing life of the deceased which, in
Virginia, includes services having pecuniary value.2 3 The services, however, must be clearly related to an exact monetary value; merely showing
that services existed will not establish dependency.2 4 Even when the services
clearly are valuable and go beyond companionship or attention, the failure
to establish their exact monetary value may prevent recovery.2 5
The financial nature of dependency excludes other types of dependency
such as legal, psychological, and emotional dependency that could be potential sources of recovery. 26 Children or the spouse of the deceased may, in
effect, be denied recovery whenever they have an independent source of
support even though they have a close relationship with the deceased involving reliance and moral dependence. For example, three teenage children
with one parent already deceased were unable in Virginia to recover for
the death of the second parent, their father.27 The father was unable to
work because of a disability, and the family was receiving social security
benefits and a Veterans' Administration pension. Because these benefits
would continue after his death, the court did not consider the children to
be dependents, since they suffered no financial loss from his death.
Finally, dependency as viewed in Virginia places undue emphasis upon
the attributes of the decedent including his health, physical condition, financial status, and age. Recovery for the death of persons such as children,
the elderly, and mental incompetents is difficult.2 8 In the case of children,
unless the facts clearly establish support for the family,29 or unless the court
is willing to adopt a liberal interpretation of the criteria for dependency, 30
recovery will be denied. 31 Neither of these circumstances has occurred
23 Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93A.2d 190(1952); see, e.g., Craig,
supra note 1, at 226; 12 WM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1, at 406.
24 Compare Pugh v. Yearout, 212 Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 58 (1972) with Claar v. Culpepper, 212 Va. 771, 188 S.E.2d 86 (1972). In Pugh, the record showed that the decedent's
services were worth from $50 to $60 a week, and the court used this to establish dependency. In contrast in Claar, the record only showed that the decedent rendered
services to his son. Recovery was denied because the nature and exact value of the
services were not established.
25 In Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 836, 188 S.E.2d 226 (1972), decedent was a young girl
of elementary school age. Her services included caring for a younger retarded brother,
acting as a "little mother" to him. The financial equivalent of these services was not
established, and the parents were unable to recover as dependents.
20 See Domijan v. Harp, 340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960); 22 Am. JUR. 2d Death § 29
(1965); Craig, supra note 1, at 225; 12 WM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1.
27 Patton v. Rose, 213 Va. 36, 189 S.E.2d 385 (1972).
28 See Craig, supra note 1, at 230; 12 WIM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1, at 407, 412.

29 Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952).
30 Thompson v. Board of Rd. Comm'rs., 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W. 2d 620 (1959).
31 See Craig, supra note 1, at 228.
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in Virginia, and recovery for the death of an elementary school child who
32
cared for a younger retarded brother has been denied.
II.

PECUNIARY Loss

Dependency is the first obstacle a claimant must pass to recover damages
in addition to the compensation the statute offers for solace. Once dependency is proven, the claimant must then show pecuniary loss suffered
from the death of the decedent. In dealing with pecuniary loss, the court is
confronted with essentially the same problem it faces for dependency. It
must determine the evidence sufficient to establish pecuniary loss.
In Virginia, the changes in the concept of pecuniary loss since 1968 have
been dramatic. Before 1968, the permissive statutory language of "fair and
just" compensation permitted the court to award damages for anything remotely resembling financial loss.33 Under the old statute, pecuniary loss was
merely a guide for fixing damages while under the new provisions, pecuniary
loss sets a statutory limitation on the damages to be recovered.3 4
Since 1968, it appears that the decedent's earnings constitute the sole basis
for measuring pecuniary loss, contrasting sharply with the old interpretation
which measured damages only in reference to probable earnings.35 The use
of earnings as the prime criteria for pecuniary loss has an immediate effect
upon recovery for the death of children. Before 1968, the earnings of a
child were not the only criterion, and evidence that the child was normal,
healthy, and well adjusted was sufficient to establish pecuniary loss.36
In using earnings as the major basis for recovery, Virginia is going against
37
a trend in many jurisdictions liberalizing the meaning of pecuniary loss.

Eliminated under the new statute is the possibility of recovery based upon
advice, comfort, and guidance.38 While not impossible, it is less likely that
recovery will be allowed for the services of a minor child or of a housewife
or for the contributions made to a family by an adult child.3 9
In summary, although statutory changes in 1968 were made to liberalize
Virginia's Wrongful Death Act, recovery is now more difficult. Raising the
32

Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 836, 188 S.E.2d 226 (1972).

33G ough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955).
34 12 Whi. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1, at 409.
35

Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 487, 78 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1953).

30 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 581, 90 S.E.2d 171, 178 (1955).
37 12 WM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 1, at 409.
38 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955).
39

See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Friend, 201 So. 2d 641 (Dist. Ct. App., Fla. 1967); Thompson

v. Board of Rd. Comm'rs, 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959); Bobrman v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 23 N. J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952); Paragon Refining Co. v. Higbea, 220

Ohio App. 440,153 N.E. 860 (1925).
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statutory maximum to $75,000 is counterbalanced by restrictive criteria for
recovery. Judicial interpretation must follow the language of the statute.
Formerly the court was able to adopt one of the most liberal approaches to
recovery for wrongful death in the United States. Today, Virginia's thinking on the question of pecuniary loss suffered by dependents appears to
follow more closely the more conservative position of the majority of courts
in the United States.
E. A. B., III

